Economy
Highlights Misunderstanding 1: The danger of Covid-19 is its short-term mortality rate. In fact, the danger of Covid-19 is its long-term mortality and morbidity rate. Misunderstanding 2: The government-imposed lockdown causes the pandemic recession. In fact, the pandemic causes the pandemic recession. Misunderstanding 3: The pandemic’s main economic casualty is output. In fact, the pandemic’s main economic casualty is employment. Misunderstanding 4: The pandemic is a temporary shock to the way we live, work, and interact. In fact, the pandemic is accelerating long-term shifts in the way we live, work, and interact. Misunderstanding 5: The pandemic is pulling Europe apart. In fact, the pandemic is pulling Europe together. Feature Chart of the WeekThe Pandemic Is Pulling Europe Together Covid-19 is a novel disease. And living through a pandemic is a novel experience for most of us. The result is that many things are not fully understood. In this report, we pull together five major misunderstandings about the Covid-19 pandemic. Or at least, five topics on which we disagree with the mainstream narratives. Misunderstanding 1: The danger of Covid-19 is its short-term mortality rate. Truth 1: The danger of Covid-19 is its long-term mortality and morbidity rate. Some people argue that the danger of Covid-19 is overstated. The mortality rate seems low, especially in the new waves of the pandemic. These people argue that we should just let the pandemic rip to achieve so-called ‘herd immunity’. Yet this focus on the low immediate mortality rate misunderstands the true danger (Chart I-2). Chart I-2Focussing On Covid-19’s Low Immediate Mortality Rate Misunderstands The Danger The true danger might come from the long-term impact on mortality and morbidity. A good analogy is a non-lethal dose of radiation. It won’t kill you straightaway, and you might not even feel any immediate ill effects, but the exposure does irreparable long-term harm. Unlike other diseases, Covid-19 appears to have long-term sequelae. Unlike other diseases, Covid-19 appears to have long-term sequelae. It can permanently damage your respiratory, vascular, and metabolic systems. As The Lancet points out:1 “Weeks and months after the onset of Covid-19, people continue to suffer. 78 of 100 patients in an observational cohort study who had recovered from Covid-19 had abnormal findings on cardiovascular MRI and 36 reported dyspnoea and unusual fatigue… these patients are not only those recovering from the severe form of the acute disease, but also those who had mild and moderate disease. Long-term sequelae of Covid-19 are unknown… Other concerns are rising: does it cause diabetes, or other metabolic disorders? Will patients develop interstitial lung disease? We owe good answers on the long-term consequences of the disease to our patients and healthcare providers.” Until we know these answers, letting the pandemic rip to achieve herd-immunity is a very dangerous misunderstanding. Misunderstanding 2: The government-imposed lockdown causes the pandemic recession. Truth 2: The pandemic causes the pandemic recession. A pandemic is a classic complex adaptive system, in which there is constant feedback from millions of individual human actions to the pandemic, and from the pandemic to millions of individual human actions. It is this complex adaptive behaviour that generates a pandemic’s classic waves of infection, as well as its recessions. In response to an escalating pandemic, our instinct for self-preservation makes us go into our shells. In response to an escalating pandemic, our instinct for self-preservation makes us go into our shells. We shun crowds and public places, with the result that so-called ‘social consumption’ collapses. The misunderstanding is that the government-imposed lockdown causes the collapse in social consumption. In fact, this is a classic confusion between correlation and causation. The true cause of the recession is that the escalating pandemic is making millions of people go into their shells. But to the extent that an escalating pandemic also leads to an escalating lockdown, many people confuse the correlated lockdown with the underlying cause, the escalating pandemic. As we have previously pointed out, Sweden imposed no lockdown, while its neighbour Denmark imposed the most extreme lockdown in Europe. If it was the government-imposed lockdown that caused the recession, then the economy of no-lockdown Sweden should have fared much better than that of lockdown Denmark. In fact, based on the rise in unemployment rates, no-lockdown Sweden performed worse than lockdown Denmark (Chart I-3 and Chart I-4). Chart I-3No-Lockdown Sweden Performed No Better... Chart I-4...Than Lockdown Denmark Misunderstanding 3: The pandemic’s main economic casualty is output. Truth 3: The pandemic’s main economic casualty is employment. The widespread use of physical distancing and face masks restricts any activity that requires the use of your mouth and nose in proximity to others. These activities are concentrated in three highly labour-intensive sectors: hospitality, retail, and transport. Using the US as a template, hospitality, retail, and transport contribute 12 percent of economic output, but employ 25 percent of all workers (Table I-1). If the pandemic forces these sectors to operate one third below full capacity, the economy will lose a tolerable 4 percent of output. But it will lose a devastating 8.3 percent of jobs. And on less optimistic assumptions, the job destruction could rise to well over 10 percent. Table I-1Sectors Hurt By Social Distancing Employ 25% Of All Workers Conversely, sectors which are unaffected by physical distancing and face masks make a much bigger contribution to economic output relative to employment. Financial activities generate 19 percent of economic output, but just 6 percent of jobs. Information technology generates 5 percent of output, but just 2 percent of jobs. Sectors hurt by social distancing employ 25 percent of all workers. Hence, the main economic casualty of the pandemic is not output. The main casualty is employment (Chart I-5 and Chart I-6). Worse, as employment suffers much more than output, the pandemic is devastating low-paid jobs. Chart I-5The Main Economic Casualty Of The Pandemic Is Employment… Chart I-6…Not ##br##Output Misunderstanding 4: The pandemic is a temporary shock to the way we live, work, and interact. Truth 4: The pandemic is accelerating long-term shifts in the way we live, work, and interact. The pandemic appears to have crystallised many shifts in consumer and business behaviour: for example, de-urbanisation, the shift from offline to online retailing, the shift from office working to remote working, and the shift from business travel to virtual meetings. In fact, these shifts were already in motion well before the pandemic hit (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8). Chart I-7The Pandemic Is Accelerating The Structural Shifts To De-Urbanisation… Chart I-8…And Online ##br##Shopping If the pandemic suddenly ended tomorrow, would people flock back to full-time office work in city centres? Would they flock back to bricks and mortar retailers? Would they return to the same intensity of long-haul business travel? We think not, because the shifts from these activities are not temporary. They are structural. The pandemic is devastating low-paid jobs. The pandemic has accelerated the hollowing out of labour-intensive industries such as bricks and mortar retailing, city centre cafes, bars and restaurants, and commercial travel. Combined with the ongoing threat to jobs from AI, this hollowing out process is blighting the job prospects of a generation, creating large numbers of underemployed and unemployed workers. Misunderstanding 5: The pandemic is pulling Europe apart. Truth 5: The pandemic is pulling Europe together. Let’s end on a positive note. The pandemic has allowed Europe to smash two major taboos: explicit fiscal transfers across countries, and the large-scale issuance of common EU bonds. The EU recovery plan also starts discussions on how the EU can ‘increase its own resources’. Which is to say, raise its own taxes. 2020 might turn out to be the most important year for European integration. The EU’s €750 billion ‘Next Generation’ recovery plan comprises €390 billion of grants whose main beneficiaries will be Italy and Spain – and these grants will be funded by common EU issuance. In breaking the long-standing taboos of fiscal transfers and common issuance, Next Generation constitutes a giant step towards European integration. Specifically, Italy’s net grant entitlement is likely to outweigh its contributions to the EU’s 2021-27 budget cycle. Thereby, Italy will flip from a net contributor to a net recipient of EU funds. The willingness to flip the sign of Italy’s contribution marks a sea-change in the EU’s attitude on fiscal solidarity, whose long-term significance should not be underestimated. 2020 might turn out to be the most important year for European integration. The irony is that it took a global pandemic to achieve it. Investment Conclusions The huge and growing slack in labour markets means that zero and negative interest rate policy will become a permanent feature of our lives. Hence, the relatively higher yielding 30-year US T-bond remains an effective hedge against stock market dislocations, as it did in March. Equity sectors whose profits can thrive off the shifts in the way we live, work, and interact, will outperform – specifically, technology, biotechnology, healthcare, and communications. Thereby, stock markets with an overweighting to these sectors will also outperform. The devastation of low-paying jobs means that bank credit growth is set to remain structurally weak or even non-existent. As such, banks should be bought for tactical countertrend moves (as now), but not for the long term. The yield spreads on euro area ‘periphery’ bonds over Germany and France will continue to tighten, and ultimately reach zero (Chart of the Week and Chart I-9). Chart I-9The Pandemic Is Pulling Europe Together Fractal Trading System* Within the EM universe, the strong outperformance of India versus Czech Republic is vulnerable to a countertrend sell-off. Accordingly, this week’s recommended trade is short MSCI India versus MSCI Czech Republic. The profit target and symmetrical stop-loss is set at 8 percent. Chart I-10MSCI: India Vs. Czech Republic In other trades, long USD/PLN achieved its 4 percent profit target, and short AUD/CHF reached the end of its holding period in profit. The rolling 1-year win ratio now stands at 57 percent. When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see The Lancet, Long-term consequences of Covid-19: research needs, September 1, 2020. Fractal Trading System Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
The final release of Q2 GDP numbers marginally revised up the quarterly annualized growth rate to -31.4% from -31.7% as personal consumption growth was revised to -33.2% from -34.1%. It is fair to say that it remains a dismal number, unlikely to be matched…
For September, the official Chinese Manufacturing PMI rose to 51.5, marginally beating expectations of 51.3. The Non-Manufacturing PMI also beat expectations, hitting 55.9, its highest reading since 2013. The Caixin PMIs confused the picture slightly by…
Tuesday night, the first of three debates ahead of the US presidential election took place and was far from presidential. Biden performed better than expected and was deemed by various polls to have won the night. Beyond the question of whether or not these…
BCA Research's China Investment Strategy & Emerging Markets Strategy services conclude that increasing regionalized global supply chains will benefit several emerging Asian economies – Vietnam and India, in particular. Meanwhile, Mexico will gain in terms of…
Highlights The first presidential debate does not change our subjective judgment on Trump’s odds of victory (35%), but our quantitative election model is flagging a major risk to this view. The V-shaped economic recovery is greatly improving Trump’s odds in key swing states – including Michigan – according to our model. We will upgrade Trump’s chances if the Republicans agree to a fiscal bill that removes the risk of further financial turmoil in the final month of the campaign. A stock market selloff combined with rising COVID-19 cases is a deadly combination for a president whose re-election bid is on thin ice. The best outcome for financial markets is a stimulus deal now, a Biden victory, and a Republican Senate. The worst outcome is no stimulus and a Democratic sweep, but there would be a silver lining in the form of major fiscal expansion in 2021. Feature The shouting match, er, debate between President Trump and former Vice President Joe Biden probably did not change many voters’ minds. Trump started stronger, Biden finished stronger. The key takeaway is that Biden lived to fight another day. At 77 years old, Biden’s age has been a concern, but he did not appear incoherent like he did in the Democratic primary election.1 From a market perspective, the debate revealed the following: The Republican failure to pass a new fiscal relief bill is hurting their re-election bid, as Biden successfully criticized Trump for not providing new resources amid the national crisis. The next 24-48 hours are critical on our view that the Senate GOP will capitulate to a deal. Joe Biden will raise taxes regardless of the recession. There is speculation that Democrats might delay tax hikes to aid the recovery but Biden did not give reason for optimism. China faces pressure from both parties. Trump blames China for the pandemic and recession while Biden hammered Trump for being weak on China. Biden is trying to steal back the thunder on manufacturing and he emphasized on-shoring more than Trump. Decoupling from China will continue regardless of the election outcome. Table 1Recessions Weigh On Incumbent Win Rates We have given Trump a 35% chance of winning since March, based on the historical odds of an incumbent party winning when a recession occurs in the year of the election. However, the economic recovery now poses a clear risk to this view. First, the historical odds rise to 50/50 if the recession ends before the election (Table 1). Second, our quantitative election model now gives Trump a 49% chance of victory, discussed below. Subjectively, we are keeping Trump at 35% because a failure to pass fiscal relief will cause a stock market selloff and remove the last leg of Trump’s re-election bid. But we will upgrade Trump if there is a relief bill and his polling gains momentum. Quant Model Upgrades Trump To 49% Odds Of Victory Our quantitative election model is upgrading Trump’s odds, having taken in the just-released Philly Fed’s coincident economic index for the month of August (Chart 1). The US economy continues to recover, and the more the data improve, the better Trump’s odds of winning the election. Chart 1Quant Model Signals Trump At 49% Odds, Michigan A Toss-Up Our quant model consists of (1) state-by-state economic indexes (2) a “time for change” variable that rewards the incumbent party after a four-year term but penalizes it after an eight-year term in the White House (3) the president’s margins of victory in the previous election (3) the range of Trump’s approval rating (rather than the level, thus avoiding any concerns about polling understating Trump’s support). Our model now predicts that Trump will win 259 Electoral College votes, an increase of 29 votes from our August update by flipping Florida back into the Republican camp with a ~60% probability. Thus Trump’s probability of winning the election has risen by 4ppt to 49%. Remarkably Michigan has risen into the ranks of a toss-up state, with a 49.6% chance of a Republican win. The coincident indicators in this state have improved drastically over the past three months and our model uses a three-month rate of change (Chart 2). Our model also gives greater weight to these indicators the closer we get to the election. In discussions with many clients we have observed that the model seemed to be underrating the key upper Midwestern battlegrounds, but now that is changing. The odds that Trump could win New Hampshire and Nevada have also improved substantially, to 41% and 25% respectively. Chart 2State Economic Indicators Put MI, NH, NV Into Play? Chart 3Swing State Wages Turning Up Still, as it stands, Democrats are still expected to win Michigan, as well as Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, thus pulling off a narrow victory in the Electoral College. Chart 4Median Family Income Improved However, the trend is in Trump’s favor. Barring very bad economic news in September, the model’s final reading on October 23 may even favor Trump for re-election. The state economic indicators are supported by additional factors: The V-shape recovery is pronounced in workers’ wages, including swing states that voted for Trump (Chart 3). Median family income is still growing – and slightly faster than when Trump took office (Chart 4). Thus it is clear that the economic recovery is a growing risk to our view that Biden will win in a Democratic clean sweep of US government. Trump Faces Imminent Risks From Pandemic And Recession In the debate, Trump successfully deflected criticisms of his handling of the economy and pinned the blame for the coronavirus on China. But a worsening of either of these factors would spell his doom in the final month of the campaign. Trump’s approval rating is still weak, though a sharp improvement would put him on the trajectory that won Presidents Bush and Obama re-election (Chart 5). Chart 5Trump Approval Rating Recovering Chart 6Trump Looks Better In Swing State Polling Biden’s lead in head-to-head polling in the swing states is stable over the course of the year so far, though Trump has recently improved and is close to or within the typical margin of error for these polls. Chart 7Trump Must Beware Whiplash From Pandemic And Recession What should prove decisive in the final month is the trajectory of the pandemic and the economy. Trump’s approval on the economy is just barely above 50%, but his handling of COVID-19 has relapsed (Chart 7). The pandemic will bring bad news over the coming month, but it is not clear how bad. New daily cases of COVID-19 are rising in the US as a whole and in key swing states like Wisconsin, Arizona, and Pennsylvania. It makes sense to see cases springing up in states that are improving rapidly in economic terms, including these states and Nevada and New Hampshire (Charts 8A & 8B). As deaths increase, bad news will affect consumers’ behavior and sentiment. Chart 8ACOVID-19 Uptick A Major Risk To Trump Chart 8BCOVID-19 Uptick A Major Risk To Trump New fiscal relief would sustain the economy even if social distancing and government restrictions increase in October to fend off this third wave in infections. Meanwhile the absence of fiscal relief will weigh on Trump’s fragile approval on the economy. Voters have consistently punished both the president and the Congress for brinksmanship over fiscal deadlines (Charts 9A & 9B). Chart 9AVoters Give Thumbs Down For Fiscal Dysfunction Chart 9BVoters Give Thumbs Down For Fiscal Dysfunction Markets also sell off when policymakers threaten to take the US over a fiscal cliff (Charts 10A & 10B). So far this is also the case in September 2020, though the jury is out. Chart 10AMarkets Sell Off During Fiscal Cliffs Chart 10BMarkets Sell Off During Fiscal Cliffs Can President Trump Stimulate By Executive Order? The president has few unilateral alternatives to a congressional fiscal bill. Chart 11Unilateral Stimulus Will Not Save Markets Several clients have asked about the Treasury’s general account, which currently holds over $1.5 trillion in cash (Chart 11). The Treasury issued lots of bonds and temporarily over-prepared for what is necessary to finance the US’s surging deficits, as the economic recovery has seen better-than-expected revenues. Our US bond strategist addressed this issue in a recent report entitled “The Case Against The Money Supply.” Could Trump unilaterally re-purpose these funds as economic stimulus if Congress fails to agree on a fiscal bill? We would not put it past the president to try – he is already stimulating by decree – but the courts would issue injunctions since the House has the constitutional power of the purse. In the meantime it would be difficult to implement the president’s orders, as with recent executive orders on extending unemployment insurance and deferring the payroll tax. Uncertainty over the US’s fiscal future would increase, not decrease, due to the legal dispute and the simultaneous risk that Republicans who had proved fiscally hawkish would retain the Senate after November 3. Therefore raiding the Treasury account is not a viable solution for markets in the absence of a real stimulus deal. And while voters might approve of the president’s actions in the face of a do-nothing Congress, the market’s negative response would damage sentiment and Trump’s approval on the economy. Investment Takeaways Our subjective reason not to upgrade Trump’s odds from 35% stems from the relationship of politics and financial markets. We have a high conviction view that the equity market will sell off if Republicans fail to conclude a fiscal deal. Financial turmoil in October will undermine recent improvements in the economy, economic sentiment, and opinion polls, as it will undermine Trump’s approval on handling the economy. The rise in COVID-19 cases reinforces the downside risk to markets, especially in the absence of stimulus. We will upgrade Trump’s odds of victory if this contradiction is resolved either through new fiscal relief or through something that improves sentiment on the pandemic, such as a credible vaccine announcement. It is hard to see Trump’s odds improving otherwise. An upgrade of Trump’s odds will increase the substantial risk of a contested election. Volatility will persist through November, with potential to expand into December and possibly even January. However we have a high conviction view that volatility will collapse by the end of January. Election scenarios would then look like this: If no fiscal relief passes, and markets sell prior to the election, then a Democratic clean sweep becomes more likely and will galvanize a move up for risk assets, as investors will look to major fiscal expansion in 2021 and beyond. But if Republicans retain the Senate in this scenario, then the need for a market riot for each future dose of stimulus will unnerve investors and the selloff will be prolonged. However, if fiscal stimulus passes prior to the election as we expect, then markets will view a Democratic sweep as an initial negative due to tax hikes and re-regulation. The prospect of fiscal expansion will only gradually become a positive factor. Thus the post-election adjustment will be short-lived. Global and cyclical equities will outperform. If stimulus passes pre-election, yet Republicans retain the Senate under a President Biden, fear of fiscal obstruction will be postponed, the prospect of tax hikes will collapse, and trade war risk will be at least somewhat reduced (Biden will be soft on global trade ex-China). This is the best outcome for risk assets, especially global equities and cyclical sectors. If stimulus passes, and Trump and the Republicans retain power, any relief rally will be short-lived as the prospect of a global trade war will loom. US equities will continue outperforming global. We are booking a small 5.7% profit on our long French energy / short US energy trade due to the risk of a Trump comeback, which would help the US energy sector. Dollar strength on near-term uncertainty will also be a headwind for this trade until the US election is resolved. Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Guy Russell Research Analyst GuyR@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Post-debate polling by CNN suggests that Biden beat expectations, performed better than Trump, and increased in voter favorability, while Trump underperformed Biden and expectations and shed favorability. However, post-debate polls tend to overrepresent Democratic-leaning voters and have not predicted past presidential election results. (Post-debate polls over the course of three debates would have predicted a Clinton win in 2016, a Romney win in 2012, and a Kerry win in 2004.)
In recent weeks, EM bonds have suffered a significant selloff as EM FX depreciated close to the levels that prevailed between March and May. EM fixed income assets suffered from a confluence of factors. First, fixed income assets (including the currencies)…
After easing for the last six months, EM financial conditions are deteriorating in response to the widening of spreads and the weakening of currencies highlighted in the Country Focus. While this deterioration in financial conditions is a reflection of the…
US consumer sentiment keeps improving. Despite elevated infection rates, US Consumer Confidence from the Conference Board rose to 101.8 from 86.3 in September. Not only was this the biggest increase in consumer sentiment in more than 17 years, it handily beat…
Highlights Treasuries: Bond yields held steady in September, even as the stock market sold off sharply. This leads us to conclude that long-maturity Treasury yields have room to fall in the near-term if progress towards a fiscal stimulus package moves too slowly. We continue to recommend keeping portfolio duration close to benchmark on a 6-12 month horizon. Corporates: Corporate spreads widened significantly in September, but they still embed a relatively optimistic default outlook. While corporate leverage has peaked, some labor market indicators have stalled. This makes us question whether defaults can improve enough to meet lofty market expectations. Continue to overweight investment grade corporates and Ba-rated junk on a 6-12 month horizon, while avoiding junk bonds rated B and lower. A Fed-Driven Sell-Off? Chart 1Treasuries A Poor Hedge In September It might seem odd to think of this month’s market weakness as a reaction to an overly hawkish Fed. With the funds rate pinned at its effective lower bound and no rate hikes expected until 2024 (at least), monetary conditions have never been more accommodative. However, the relative performance of different asset classes in September leads us to only one conclusion. Financial markets had been priced for even more central bank dovishness this month, and came away disappointed. Equity Sectors Responded To Monetary Tightness, Not Weaker Growth First, consider the simple observation that risk assets (equities and credit) have sold off sharply since September 2nd but the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury Index actually underperformed a position in cash (Chart 1). Investors have seen none of the usual hedging benefits from bonds. Some of this can be chalked up to the relative performance of different equity sectors (Table 1). Tech stock underperformance was responsible for the bulk of September’s market weakness, particularly early in the month. Meanwhile, the most cyclical (or growth-sensitive) sectors – Industrials, Energy and Materials – performed only slightly worse than traditionally defensive sectors. Typically, cyclical sectors perform worst when the stock market is responding to a negative re-rating of economic growth expectations. The fact that cyclicals weren’t the worst performers this month suggests that the sell-off had a different catalyst. Table 1Equity & Treasury Returns: September 2nd To September 25th The sector composition of the sell-off has important implications for bond yields because the relative performance between cyclical and defensive equity sectors explains more of the variation in the 10-year Treasury yield than the overall performance of the stock market (Chart 2). Chart 2Relative Sector Performance Matters For Bond Yields Commodities Suggest A Hawkish Policy Surprise … Table 2Commodities & Bond Yields: September 2nd To September 25th Second, consider the performance of industrial commodities and gold (Table 2). Growth-sensitive industrial commodities held up pretty well this month, but gold fared poorly. The relatively strong performance of industrial commodities suggests that markets were not pricing-in a significant shock to global growth expectations. Weakness in gold suggests that investors started to price-in less long-run inflation risk. This is the exact sort of performance you would expect if the central bank delivered an unexpected dose of monetary tightening. Along with the relative performance of equity sectors, the relative performance between industrial commodities and gold also helps explain why Treasury yields remained stable. The ratio between the CRB Raw Industrials Index and gold is tightly correlated with the 10-year Treasury yield (Chart 3). Chart 3Bond Yields Track The CRB/Gold Ratio … As Do Inflation-Linked Bonds Third, we can look at relative movements in nominal yields, real yields and inflation breakevens. Recall that we like to think of nominal yields as being driven by fed funds rate expectations and of inflation breakevens as being driven by inflation expectations. Real yields have no independent driver, but can be calculated using the Fisher Equation:1 Real Yield = Nominal Yield – Inflation Expectations With that in mind, look at how yields have moved since the stock market’s September 2nd peak (Table 2). The 10-year TIPS breakevens rate is down sharply but the 10-year nominal yield is unchanged. This suggests that the market moved to price-in less long-run inflation risk alongside an unchanged path for the policy rate. The result of the interaction between those two drivers is a sharp move up in the 10-year real yield. Credit Performance Also Looks Policy Driven Table 3Corporate Bond Excess Returns*: September 2nd To September 25th Finally, we can look at the relative performance of different corporate bond credit tiers (Table 3). In a typical risk-off market driven by greater pessimism about the outlook for economic growth, we would expect to see the bulk of underperformance concentrated in the lowest credit tiers where bonds are most likely to default. However, since September 2nd, Ba-rated issuers have underperformed all lower-rated credit tiers, even distressed Ca/C-rated issuers. One possible explanation is that Ba-rated and higher corporate bonds generally benefit from the Fed’s emergency lending facilities while B-rated and lower credits are mostly locked out. It could be that September’s market moves reflect some increased pessimism about the Fed’s ability or willingness to stick with its emergency facilities. Or more likely, there had been some hopes that the Fed would somehow expand its current emergency lending facilities. Hopes that were dashed when Chair Powell testified to Congress last week and seemed to suggest that the Fed has already done all it can in this regard. Investment Implications For us, this is the main takeaway from September’s strange market moves: Fed policy is certainly in no rush to tighten, but equally, the Fed can’t deliver any further easing on its own. All it can do is continue to support credit markets with its current emergency facilities and refrain from lifting rates even if inflation starts to rise. Those looking for an additional dose of economic adrenaline should look to fiscal policymakers, not the Fed. With regards to markets, since September’s moves don’t appear to reflect expectations for weaker economic growth, we fret that such a shock could still emerge. The most likely near-term catalyst would be the failure of Congress to pass a new stimulus package. We have previously written that consumer spending will not be able to sustain a decent growth rate without additional income support from Congress.2 If it looks like a deal is not forthcoming or we see some negative consumer spending data, there is room for cyclical equity sectors and bond yields to move lower. We view this as a material near-term risk. September’s junk bond weakness was unusual in that higher-rated credits performed worse than lower-rated ones. Beyond the near-term, on a 6-12 month horizon, we continue to believe that the economic recovery will continue. Congress will ultimately deliver sufficient stimulus, though it may not come in time to prevent a near-term market reaction. The conflict between these near-term and medium-term views leads us to maintain our cautious cyclical investment stance. We recommend keeping portfolio duration close to benchmark while holding duration-neutral yield curve steepeners that are designed to profit from higher yields on a 6-12 month horizon.3 More specifically, we advise medium- and long-run investors who are already exposed to curve steepeners to stay the course. But if you aren’t yet exposed, it is a good idea to wait until a follow-up stimulus bill is announced before moving in. An Update On Corporate Sector Health And The Default Rate As noted above, September’s junk bond weakness was unusual in that higher-rated credits performed worse than lower-rated ones. As with our Treasury call, the fact that markets appeared to react to a policy shock and not a growth shock makes us nervous that a near-term growth shock is still not in the price. We see low-rated junk bonds as looking particularly complacent, especially when you consider that spreads continue to embed a relatively optimistic default outlook. Calculating The Spread-Implied Default Rate Our workhorse valuation tool for junk bonds is the Default-Adjusted Spread. This is the average index option-adjusted spread less default losses observed over the subsequent 12-month period. For example, the Default-Adjusted Spread came in at -301 basis points for the 12-month period ending August 2020. This is equal to the August 2019 index spread of 393 bps less realized default losses of 694 bps that occurred between August 2019 and August 2020. Over time, we have found that the Default-Adjusted Spread does a good job of explaining excess junk returns and that, typically, a Default-Adjusted Spread of at least 150 bps is required for high-yield to outperform duration-matched Treasuries on a 12-month investment horizon (Chart 4).4 Chart 4Calculating The Spread-Implied Default Rate With that knowledge, we can set a target Default-Adjusted Spread of 150 bps and calculate the default rate that would have to occur during the next 12 months to hit that target. We call this the Spread-Implied Default Rate, and it is presented in the bottom panel of Chart 4. As of today, the Spread-Implied Default Rate is 5.1%. This means that if the speculative grade default rate comes in below 5.1% during the next 12 months, then our Default-Adjusted Spread will be above 150 bps and junk bonds will likely outperform Treasuries. If the default rate turns out to be above 5.1%, then the prospects for junk bond outperformance look dimmer. Can The Default Rate Fall To 5%? The logical question then becomes whether it’s possible for the default rate to fall to 5% during the next 12 months. This would certainly be a rapid improvement from its current level of 8.7%, but not one that is without historical precedent. In fact, the default rate tends to fall very quickly when the economy is coming out of recession and, already, August saw only six default events. This is down from above 20 in May, June and July (Chart 5). Chart 5Only Six Defaults In August Obviously, whether August’s gains can be maintained depends on the speed of economic recovery. In particular, we focus on nonfinancial corporate sector gross leverage – the ratio between total debt and pre-tax profits – and job cut announcements (Chart 6). Chart 6Default Rate Drivers Looking first at leverage, corporate profits plunged in the second quarter but that will probably represent the cyclical trough (Chart 7, top panel). Already, we see that analysts are revising up their earnings expectations (Chart 7, panel 2). Typically, positive net earnings revisions coincide with positive profit growth. On the debt side, firms issued massive amounts of debt in the first and second quarters (Chart 7, panel 3), but that process is also over. We note that the Financing Gap – the difference between capital expenditures and retained earnings – dipped into negative territory in Q2 (Chart 7, bottom panel). This means that firms retained more earnings than they needed to cover capital expenditures and suggests that further debt issuance is not necessary. When the Financing Gap moved below zero in 2009, it ushered in a lengthy period of corporate deleveraging. Chart 7Firms Have Enough Retained Earnings To Cover Capex It is therefore quite likely that both corporate sector leverage and the default rate have already peaked. The question is whether both can fall quickly enough to meet market expectations. Of this, we are less certain. When the Financing Gap moved below zero in 2009, it ushered in a lengthy period of corporate deleveraging. Job Cut Announcements – another predictor of corporate defaults – have also improved markedly since April, but they remain well above pre-COVID levels (Chart 8). Further, an array of other employment indicators suggest that labor market improvement has stalled during the past few weeks. Initial unemployment claims have flattened off and remain well above pre-COVID levels (Chart 8, panel 2). What’s more, high frequency data from scheduling firm Homebase show that the total number of employees working for companies using the Homebase software is no longer rising and is far below its pre-COVID level (Chart 8, bottom panel). It’s important to note that the Homebase data are biased toward small businesses, mostly in the restaurant, food & beverage, retail and services sectors. Those sectors have obviously been hit the hardest by COVID, but those are also the sectors where we are likely to see the bulk of corporate defaults. Chart 8Labor Market Indicators Investment Conclusions We are confident that the default rate has peaked, but we aren’t yet confident enough to recommend owning B-rated and below junk bonds. To make that recommendation we would need to have confidence that the default rate will move to 5% or lower during the next 12 months. The default rate was already 4.5% in the 12 months prior to COVID, and it now appears that most labor market data are stalling at worse than pre-COVID levels. An array of employment indicators suggest that labor market improvement has stalled during the past few weeks. We reiterate our recommendation to overweight investment grade and Ba-rated corporate bonds, while avoiding high-yield bonds rated B and lower. We will consider adding exposure to low-rated junk bonds if spreads rise to more attractive levels in the near-term and/or if Congress announces a significant stimulus package that looks poised to boost the economic recovery and labor market. Appendix A: Buy What The Fed Is Buying The Fed rolled out a number of aggressive lending facilities on March 23. These facilities focused on different specific sectors of the US bond market. The fact that the Fed has decided to support some parts of the market and not others has caused some traditional bond market correlations to break down. It has also led us to adopt of a strategy of “Buy What The Fed Is Buying”. That is, we favor those sectors that offer attractive spreads and that benefit from Fed support. The below Table tracks the performance of different bond sectors since the March 23 announcement. We will use this to monitor bond market correlations and evaluate our strategy’s success. Table 4Performance Since March 23 Announcement Of Emergency Fed Facilities Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 For more details on this forecasting framework please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Negative Oil, The Zero Lower Bound And The Fisher Equation”, dated April 28, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “More Stimulus Needed”, dated September 15, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 For more details on our yield curve recommendations please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Positioning For Reflation And Avoiding Deflation”, dated August 11, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 To calculate the Spread-Implied Default Rate we also need to estimate the 12-month recovery rate. We assume a recovery rate of 25%, slightly better than the 20% recovery rate seen during the past 12 months. Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

